Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture

Werner Güth, Radosveta Ivanova‐Stenzel and Sigve Tjøtta ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Metroeconomica, 2004, vol. 55, issue 1, 1-21

Abstract: Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical data or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. The female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of two forms of joint venture where more labor division makes her more exploitable by her partner. More specifically, the random profit of the joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in the case of a full engagement whereas marriage bargaining is procedurally fair in the case of a low engagement. Our treatment variables are her and his outside options representing different attitudes to investing in human capital.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0026-1386.2004.00179.x

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Working Paper: Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture (2000)
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