THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY

Ankur Chavda and Marc Jegers

Metroeconomica, 2007, vol. 58, issue 2, 231-243

Abstract: Using a stylized oligopoly model, we analyze the effect of cartel deterring fines, taking into consideration exemptions granted to cartel members cooperating with the competition authorities. We conclude that the fines can act as a deterrent to breaking collusive agreements, thus stabilizing the cartel.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00266.x

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