ALCHIAN AND DEMSETZ'S CRITIQUE OF THE COOPERATIVE FIRM THIRTY‐SEVEN YEARS AFTER

Bruno Jossa

Metroeconomica, 2009, vol. 60, issue 4, 686-714

Abstract: The author discusses the critique of cooperatives implied in Alchian and Demsetz's argument that efficiency is maximized when the central agent managing the firm and watching the labour force at work is the residual claimant. Entering upon a number of criticisms that Alchian and Demsetz's approach attracted over the years, he concludes that their critique does not hold, and his basic argument is that cooperative firms vesting the monitoring function in elected managers will not be less efficient than capitalistic firms in the same situation.

Date: 2009
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