A Generalization of the Lone Wolf Theorem

Hakan Inal

Metroeconomica, 2014, vol. 65, issue 4, 541-547

Abstract: A non-constructive generalization of the ‘lone wolf’ theorem, which states that in the roommates problem an agent is single in a stable matching if and only if that agent is single in every other stable matching, is presented. The generalization is in two directions: (i) the set of permissible roommates is arbitrary as long as all singles are allowed, and (ii) the set of preference profiles is any subset of the set of all profiles of strict preferences defined over permissible roommates.

Date: 2014
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