Decisive coalitions and positive responsiveness

Sususmu Cato ()

Metroeconomica, 2018, vol. 69, issue 1, 308-323

Abstract: This paper addresses the Arrovian social choice problem. Our focus is the role of positive responsiveness, which requires social judgments to be strongly monotonic with respect to individual judgments. We clarify the structure of decisive coalitions associated with collective choice rules that satisfy positive responsiveness and Arrow's axioms. Transitivity of social preferences is relaxed to quasi†transitivity or acyclicity.

Date: 2018
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