Incompleteness, regularity, and collective preference
Sususmu Cato ()
Metroeconomica, 2020, vol. 71, issue 2, 333-344
This paper examines the incompleteness of collective preference. We provide a series of Arrovian impossibility theorems without completeness. First, we consider the notion of regularity introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006, Games and Economic Behavior 56, 61–86); it is an appropriate richness property for strict preference when preference is allowed to be incomplete. We examine the implication of imposing regularity on collective preference. Second, we propose responsiveness, a variation of positive responsiveness. This axiom requires that some changes in individual preferences make an alternative weakly better than another. Third, we consider coherency conditions for collective preferences; this conditionally requires the existence of comparable pairs in a certain manner. We prove an impossibility result for each condition using Arrovian axioms.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:metroe:v:71:y:2020:i:2:p:333-344
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