Mutuality, Performance and Executive Compensation

Hilary Ingham and Steve Thompson

Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 1995, vol. 57, issue 3, 295-308

Abstract: The determinants of CEO compensation within the U.K. Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986-90, the authors find only weak support for the existence of a positive performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast, they find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market-based control systems are absent, the authors' results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the U.K. building societies. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Date: 1995
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