What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market? – Evidence from a Field Study

Alexander Rasch and Christian Waibel

Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2018, vol. 80, issue 3, 605-624

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of competition on an expert firm's incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market. Controlling for the competence of car repair shops, their financial situation, and reputational concerns, we use and complement the data set from a nationwide field study conducted by the German Automobile Association that regularly checks the reliability of garages in Germany. We find that more intense competition lowers a firm's incentive to defraud its customers.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12204

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Working Paper: What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study (2013)
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