Föderalismusreform II: Zur Frage des Controlling der Konsolidierungshilfen

Joachim Ragnitz

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2010, vol. 11, issue 3, 260-269

Abstract: Abstract: In 2009, German federal fiscal relationships were reorganized in order to introduce binding rules for a reduction of public deficits. One element of this reform are so called “consolidation transfers” for heavily indebted states as an measure to reduce debt. In turn, receiving states have to run a strict consolidation strategy in the years to come, that is a reduction of public expenditure. It is shown that these bail‐out rules will only help if the accompanying regulations will be enforced in a restrictive matter; however. There are risks that this will not be pursued in a proper way.

Date: 2010
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