Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland*

Matthias Kräkel

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2006, vol. 7, issue 1, 105-126

Abstract: Abstract: The ‘Gesetz zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung (ProfBesReformG)’ lays down that the pay of German professors shall be linked more closely to their actual performance. Furthermore, total payment to all professors shall be fixed in advance. Combining both characteristics leads to an incentive scheme which is well known in labor economics – a tournament or contest, in which agents are rewarded according to relative performance. In this article, the results of the tournament theory are used to discuss possible advantages and disadvantages of the ProfBesReformG. In principle, the ministry of each federal state has to choose between two alternative ways in organizing a professors’ tournament. There can be either a tournament within each faculty, or a tournament between different faculties. Unfortunately, both alternatives are problematic for different reasons.

Date: 2006
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