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Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht: Höhere Transparenz und Effizienz durch Vereinheitlichung*

Lena Koller, Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner ()

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2007, vol. 8, issue 3, 242-255

Abstract: Abstract: In Germany, many labour laws and regulations apply only in establishments above a critical size, and usually these thresholds are defined by the number of employees. The existing 160 thresholds are complex and defined inconsistently, making it difficult for firms to obey the law. Moreover, exceeding a threshold may result in costs for the firm such as establishing a works council or paying a penalty for not employing disabled persons. Although the empirical evidence is mixed, some studies suggest that employment growth is dampened by firms trying not to exceed thresholds. In order to minimize these transaction costs and side effects, we make several suggestions to simplify and unify the threshold regulations.

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2007.00250.x

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Working Paper: Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht: Höhere Transparenz und Effizienz durch Vereinheitlichung (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht: Höhere Transparenz und Effizienz durch Vereinheitlichung (2007) Downloads
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Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Lars P. Feld, J¸rgen von Hagen, Bernd Rudolph and Achim Wambach

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