Can exclusive territories limit strategic location downstream?*

Kenneth Fjell and John Heywood

Papers in Regional Science, 2005, vol. 84, issue 2, 221-237

Abstract: Abstract. Research on spatial price discrimination demonstrates that strategic (off centre) location choices by downstream firms can increase downstream profit and reduce both the profit of an upstream monopoly and social welfare. This article examines exclusive territories as a vertical control mechanism and shows that such territories can force downstream firms to return to the centre of the market. However, exclusive territories cannot completely eliminate the influence of strategic downstream location – the profit maximising exclusive territories are either too small or too large to be socially efficient.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5957.2005.00014.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:presci:v:84:y:2005:i:2:p:221-237

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