Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers

Kathleen Mullen, Richard G. Frank and Meredith B. Rosenthal

RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, vol. 41, issue 1, 64-91

Abstract: Despite the popularity of pay‐for‐performance (P4P) among health policy makers and private insurers as a tool for improving quality of care, there is little empirical basis for its effectiveness. We use data from published performance reports of physician medical groups contracting with a large network HMO to compare clinical quality before and after the implementation of P4P, relative to a control group. We consider the effect of P4P on both rewarded and unrewarded dimensions of quality. In the end, we fail to find evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement in quality or notable disruption in care.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (90)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers (2009)
Working Paper: Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:64-91

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261

Access Statistics for this article

RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().