Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers

Kathleen Mullen, Richard Frank and Meredith Rosenthal

No WR-680, Working Papers from RAND Corporation

Abstract: Despite the popularity of pay-for-performance (P4P) among health policymakers and private insurers as a tool for improving quality of care, there is little empirical basis for its effectiveness. The authors use data from published performance reports of physician medical groups contracting with a large network HMO to compare clinical quality before and after the implementation of P4P, relative to a control group. They consider the effect of P4P on both rewarded and unrewarded dimensions of quality. In the end, they fail to find evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement in quality or notable disruption in care.

JEL-codes: D23 H51 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2009-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers (2010)
Working Paper: Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers (2009)
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