Economics at your fingertips  

The bidder exclusion effect

Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen () and Kane Sweeney

RAND Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 50, issue 1, 93-120

Abstract: We introduce a new, simple‐to‐compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric, conditionally independent private values. The test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random, which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics. This object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers. We illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions, where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Bidder Exclusion Effect (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261

Access Statistics for this article

RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Page updated 2022-08-16
Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:50:y:2019:i:1:p:93-120