The Bidder Exclusion Effect

Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen and Kane Sweeney

No 20523, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results to empirical work. It applies in a broad range of information settings and auction formats without requiring instruments or estimation of a complex structural model. We demonstrate the approach using US timber and used-car auction data.

JEL-codes: C10 D44 L10 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ecm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019. "The bidder exclusion effect," The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 50(1), pages 93-120.

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Journal Article: The bidder exclusion effect (2019)
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