Intertemporal price discrimination with two products

Jean Rochet and John Thanassoulis

RAND Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 50, issue 4, 951-973

Abstract: We study the two‐product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly ordered, then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations, we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling. So we show that the established no‐discrimination‐across‐time result does not extend to two‐product sellers under standard taste distributions.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12301

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Working Paper: Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Two Products (2017)
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