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Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products

Jean Rochet () and John Thanassoulis ()

No 12034, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller requires intertemporal price discrimination and it can be implemented by dynamic pricing on the cross-sell to the bundle. If consumers are perfectly negatively correlated, reducing the cross-sell price at a single point in time is optimal. For general valuations we show that if the cross-partial derivative of the profit function is negative then dynamic pricing on the cross-sell is more profitable than fixing prices. So we show that the celebrated Stokey (1979) no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to multiple good sellers when consumers' valuations are drawn from the tilted uniform, the shifted uniform, the exponential, or the normal distribution. We extend our results to welfare, to complementarities in demand, and to the determination of optimal discount schedules.

Keywords: Multidimensional Mechanism Design; Second Degree Price Discrimination; Bundling; Time Discounting; Cross-sell. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-mkt
Date: 2017-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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