EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Maintenance, Housing Quality, and Vacancies under Imperfect Information

Colin Read

Real Estate Economics, 1991, vol. 19, issue 2, 138-153

Abstract: A model of a rental housing market is presented in which landlords economize on the maintenance of housing quality to profit from tenants imperfect information. In a partial equilibrium model that describes tenants by their distribution of minimum acceptable (reservation) quality for units priced at an identical rent, these profits induce entry of new units, resulting in rental vacancies. The equilibrium number of landlords and the market vacancy rate are derived in a free entry, imperfect information equilibrium in which the distribution of rental unit qualities range from the competitive quality to that which would be offered by a monopoly landlord.

Date: 1991
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00546

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:19:y:1991:i:2:p:138-153

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1080-8620

Access Statistics for this article

Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous

More articles in Real Estate Economics from American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:19:y:1991:i:2:p:138-153