The Welfare Effects of Non‐Price Competition Among Real Estate Brokers

Thomas Miceli

Real Estate Economics, 1992, vol. 20, issue 4, 519-532

Abstract: This paper examines the role of brokers in economizing on transaction costs in the housing market. By lowering the cost of transactions, brokers create welfare gains compared to a market in which buyers and sellers transact on their own. However, if brokers engage in unproductive, non‐price competition to acquire a larger share of available listings, then some of the welfare gains are dissipated. Using a partial equilibrium model, this paper shows how an excessive commission rate can lead to this result.

Date: 1992
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00594

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:519-532

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1080-8620

Access Statistics for this article

Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous

More articles in Real Estate Economics from American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().