Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land use Change

Peter F. Colwell

Real Estate Economics, 1997, vol. 25, issue 4, 525-537

Abstract: A two‐tiered, front‐end‐loaded tender offer system is shown to catalyze a market for partial property rights. This market would obviate any legitimate need for governmental zoning, and thus would put an end to zoning's inefficiency and inequity. The proposed system would facilitate development and redevelopment, cause nuisance producing zones to become more compact, stop the subversion of zoning for fiscal and exclusionary purposes, reduce the opportunities for corruption and end rent seeking as well as “not in my backyard” activities. The proposed tender offer system would fully compensate those who are injured by negative externalities, thereby eliminating adverse distributional effects.

Date: 1997
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