What Do Rental Contracts Reveal About Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Rental Housing Markets?

John D. Benjamin, Kenneth M. Lusht and James D. Shilling

Real Estate Economics, 1998, vol. 26, issue 2, 309-329

Abstract: This article examines the pricing of rental contracts for two types of renter households: those who are able to amass a large, up‐front security deposit and those with little, or no, security to offer. Empirical tests are presented to suggest that, in dealing with renter households who have little, or no, security to offer, landlords earn at a similar rate of return as lenders who make riskier loans at a high interest rate to borrowers of dubious credit. The analysis suggests that this situation occurs in large part because of the problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard between landlords and renter households regarding the latter's use of the premises.

Date: 1998
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