The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance

Ronald C. Rutherford, Thomas M. Springer and Abdullah Yavas ()

Real Estate Economics, 2001, vol. 29, issue 3, 389-409

Abstract: This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the exclusive agency and exclusive‐right‐to‐sell contracts used in real estate brokerage. The theoretical model predicts that while both contract types will yield the same price, the exclusive agency contract will result in faster sales than the exclusive‐right‐to‐sell contract. In the empirical model, we find that houses sold faster under the exclusive agency contract than the exclusive‐right‐to‐sell contract. However, houses sold with exclusive agency contracts also sold at a marginally lower price. We also find a slightly greater concession from the listing price at the negotiation stage of exclusive agency listings.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1080-8620.00016

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:29:y:2001:i:3:p:389-409

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1080-8620

Access Statistics for this article

Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous

More articles in Real Estate Economics from American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().