 Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q‐Ratios: Evidence from REITsDennis Capozza and Paul J. Seguin Real Estate Economics, 2003, vol. 31, issue 3, 367-404 Abstract: We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's q). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine the impact of insider ownership on agency costs since we can accurately measure the costs of the entire management team. Our results show that firms with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. At the same time, managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Finally, higher levels of insider ownership are associated with higher relative valuation as measured by both higher premiums to net asset value and higher multiples of cash flows. The results have implications for the design of optimal management contracts for both REITs and firms in general. Date: 2003 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:31:y:2003:i:3:p:367-404 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous More articles in Real Estate Economics from American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC. |
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