 Corporate Governance and Performance: The REIT EffectRob Bauer, Piet Eichholtz and Nils Kok Real Estate Economics, 2010, vol. 38, issue 1, 1-29 Abstract: Real estate investment trusts (REITs) offer a natural experiment in corporate governance due to the fact that they leave little free cash flow for management, which reduces agency problems. We exploit a unique and leading corporate governance database to test whether corporate governance matters for the performance of U.S. REITs. We document for a sample including governance ratings of more than 220 REITs that firm value is significantly related to firm‐level governance for REITs with low payout ratios only. Repeating the analysis with the complete database that includes more than 5,000 companies and a control sample of firms with high corporate real estate ratios, we find a strong and significantly positive relation between our governance index and several performance variables, indicating that the partial lack of a relation between governance and performance in the real estate sector might be explained by a REIT effect. Date: 2010 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:38:y:2010:i:1:p:1-29 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous More articles in Real Estate Economics from American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC. |
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