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Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

Yuen Leng Chow, Isa Hafalir and Abdullah Yavas ()

Real Estate Economics, 2015, vol. 43, issue 2, 432-470

Abstract: type="main"> We offer a theoretical and empirical comparison of auctions and negotiated sales. We first build a simple model to show that auctions generate a higher relative price than negotiated sales when demand for the asset is strong, when the asset is more homogeneous and when the asset attracts buyers with higher valuations. Using data from property sales in Singapore, we find support for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we find that auctions do not necessarily generate a higher price premium for foreclosed properties than for nonforeclosed properties.

Date: 2015
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Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous

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