Dividend Manipulation at Unlisted REITs

Jonathan A. Wiley

Real Estate Economics, 2018, vol. 46, issue 4, 887-935

Abstract: Dividend policy at unlisted firms is confounded by the continuous equity offering—as exists for unlisted REITs. Unlisted firms lack visible share prices, which heightens the sensitivity of investors to dividends paid during the offering. By paying high dividends early, managers of unlisted REITs positively influence the flow of new equity. Dividend manipulation occurs when discretionary yields are exceptionally high and predominantly favorable dividend changes occur during the equity offering, followed by a surge in unfavorable changes after the offering. Evidence of dividend manipulation at unlisted REITs is provided where even discretionary yields are significantly reduced once the offering expires.

Date: 2018
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