Shareholder Activism in REITs

David H. Downs, Miroslava Straska and H. Gregory Waller

Real Estate Economics, 2019, vol. 47, issue 1, 66-103

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that shareholder activism in REITs is less prevalent than in other (non‐REIT) public firms because of stronger barriers to hostile takeovers and potentially less undervaluation. Our results, however, suggest that the conventional wisdom does not hold. Specifically, we find that in 2006–2015, Equity REITs (EREITs) are as likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as non‐EREITs. We also find that shareholder campaign characteristics and determinants, as well as their value consequences, appear similar for EREITs and non‐EREITs. Given that this is the first study to examine shareholder activism in REITs, we raise several questions for future research.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12242

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:47:y:2019:i:1:p:66-103

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