Bidding for Land Development

David Whitaker

Real Estate Economics, 1981, vol. 9, issue 3, 223-233

Abstract: This paper is concerned with applying an optimum bidding procedure, originally proposed by Friedman, to the purchase of development land. It is assumed that the vendor sells the land to the highest bidder in a sealed bid auction without any consideration of the design of the proposed development. Friedman's model for optimal bidding is introduced, and a case study is presented to demonstrate its applicability.

Date: 1981
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