WTO Exceptions as Insurance

Ronald Fischer and Thomas Prusa

Review of International Economics, 2003, vol. 11, issue 5, 745-757

Abstract: The paper formalizes the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. The authors use a general‐equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. It is shown that sector‐specific contingent protection measures are superior to uniform contingent tariffs as an insurance mechanism. A tax‐cum‐subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) also improves welfare and is superior to contingent protection.

Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1467-9396.2003.00415.x

Related works:
Chapter: WTO Exceptions as Insurance (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:11:y:2003:i:5:p:745-757

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0965-7576

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi

More articles in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().