Equity Purchases by Insiders and the Filing of Antidumping Petitions

James C. Hartigan and Cynthia Rogers

Review of International Economics, 2003, vol. 11, issue 5, 789-810

Abstract: The paper presents the first analysis of insider trading in the context of public policy implementation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proscribes trading by corporate insiders upon material information that is not yet in the public domain. Although the SEC interprets what constitutes material information, it has historically focused on earnings, mergers, and acquisitions. Using a panel of US firms from 1985–87, the authors disclose a significant relationship between the filing of an antidumping petition and insider buying in the two months preceding the filing month. This suggests that the SEC should expand its focus to include public policy.

Date: 2003
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