Voluntary Export Restraints under Imperfect Competition

Masayuki Okawa

Review of International Economics, 2004, vol. 12, issue 1, 138-150

Abstract: The paper studies the effects of a change in the level of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on the behavior of the domestic firm and on the welfare of the importing country. The author constructs a simple two‐country Cournot duopoly model in which each firm produces a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost. It is shown that the results obtained by predecessors based on linear demand, constant‐elasticity demand, strategic substitutes and so forth all emerge as special cases.

Date: 2004
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