Rules of Origin in North–South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA

José Ansón (), Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Jaime de Melo, Akiko Suwa‐Eisenmann and Bolormaa Tumurchudur
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann

Review of International Economics, 2005, vol. 13, issue 3, 501-517

Abstract: All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North–South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North–South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal–agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00520.x

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Working Paper: Rules of origin in North-South preferential trading arrangements with an application to NAFTA (2005)
Working Paper: Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA (2005)
Working Paper: Rules of origin in north-south preferential trading arrangements with an application to NAFTA (2004)
Working Paper: Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA (2003)
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