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Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff‐rate Import Quotas**

Jana Hranaiova and Harry de Gorter ()

Review of International Economics, 2005, vol. 13, issue 4, 805-821

Abstract: This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays.

Date: 2005
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