Cartel Stability and Economic Integration
Review of International Economics, 2007, vol. 15, issue 2, 313-320
This paper revisits the notion that economic integration—modeled as a reduction of trade costs—may be anticompetitive, in the sense that it may reinforce the ability of an international cartel to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other’s markets. The paper is novel in terms of introducing ad valorem and fixed trade costs in addition to the customary unit trade costs. It is shown that an anticompetitive effect, found for reductions in unit trade costs, may disappear once trade costs are ad valorem or fixed.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Cartel Stability and Economic Integration (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:15:y:2007:i:2:p:313-320
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0965-7576
Access Statistics for this article
Review of International Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi
More articles in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().