Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

Akihiko Yanase ()

Review of International Economics, 2007, vol. 15, issue 3, 592-611

Abstract: The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.

Date: 2007
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