Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game*

Hideo Konishi, Carsten Kowalczyk and Tomas Sjostrom

Review of International Economics, 2009, vol. 17, issue 2, 304-309

Abstract: This paper shows nonemptiness of the core of a customs union game with a status quo equilibrium with tariffs by employing an appropriate notion of the core as in Kowalczyk and Sjöström (1994, Economica). Specifically, we find that if customs unions may have no effects on nonmember countries as in Ohyama (1972, Keio Economic Studies) and Kemp and Wan (1976, Journal of International Economics) then a subset of countries forming such a customs union does not block global free trade when accompanied by so‐called Grinols transfers (Grinols, 1981, Journal of International Economics).

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2009.00825.x

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