Lobbying for Tariff Policies

Wolfgang Mayer

Review of International Economics, 1993, vol. 1, issue 3, 221-33

Abstract: This paper fully specifies the political and economic markets in which trade policies are formulated and lobbying efforts are determined. In the political market, the winner of a two-candidate race chooses policies, and both candidates have incomplete information about the nonpolicy biases of voters. Voting is probablistic and lobbying consists of informing candidates of the lobby members' nonpolicy voting biases. Economic markets are described by a Heckscher-Ohlin model. The determinants of lobbying expenditures are developed from these microfoundations instead of being introduced in an ad hoc manner. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1993
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