International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design
Wolfgang Buchholz (),
Alexander Haupt () and
Review of International Economics, 2013, vol. 21, issue 4, 705-718
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Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design (2012)
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