International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Alexander Haupt () and Wolfgang Peters

Review of International Economics, 2013, vol. 21, issue 4, 705-718

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/roie.12065 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:21:y:2013:i:4:p:705-718

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0965-7576

Review of International Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi

More articles in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().