Public policy, footloose capital, and union influence

Tapio Palokangas

Review of International Economics, 2020, vol. 28, issue 4, 976-991

Abstract: This document sets up a unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium model of countries, where capital is footloose and governments maximize utilitarian welfare. When capital owners have weak influence on public policy, there is unemployment and the governments compete for jobs, causing a distortion with suboptimal wages. Then globalization—as characterized by a decrease in impediments to international investment—increases the wage elasticity of capital flight, decreasing wages and increasing employment. This benefits the capital owners and the unemployed workers getting a job, but harms the other workers. International coordination of public policy alleviates these consequences of globalization.

Date: 2020
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