Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union
Pierre Cahuc and
Hubert Kempf ()
Review of International Economics, 1997, vol. 5, issue 4, 92-110
Abstract:
The paper studies alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary union. Wages are fixed by trade unions for two periods, either at the national or the monetary union level. It is shown that the best solution with regard to unemployment depends on the nature of externalities and dynamic strategic interactions between the monetary union's countries; namely on the degree of openness of the monetary union, and the differentiation index between national goods. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:5:y:1997:i:4:p:92-110
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