The Dynamics of Tariff Retaliation between the United States and Canada: Theory and Evidence

Alok Bohara, Kishore Gawande and William Kaempfer

Review of International Economics, 1998, vol. 6, issue 1, 30-49

Abstract: This paper presents theory and empirical evidence showing a retaliatory pattern in US-Canadian tariff interactions in the period 1868-1970, whereby the changes in the tariff level of each country are Granger-caused by the other. In the long run, the USA maintains the tariff changes that it initiates while the Canadian policy tends to back away from changes that it initiates. Furthermore, Canadian policy demonstrates a permanent change following US innovations, while in the long run the US tariff returns to its own internal equilibrium unaffected by innovations in the Canadian tariff. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:6:y:1998:i:1:p:30-49

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0965-7576

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi

More articles in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().