The Scope for Exchange Rate Passthrough in a Duopolistic Supergame

Richard Damania

Review of International Economics, 1999, vol. 7, issue 2, 306-21

Abstract: This paper represents one of the first analyses of exchange rate passthrough in a dynamic context. It explores the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in a duopoly where the firms interact over an indefinite period. In these circumstances there exists an incentive for the duopolists to tacitly collude. The paper investigates the manner in which exchange rate changes influence the inherent tension that exists between the incentives to collude and compete. It is shown that the sign and degree of exchange rate passthrough depends critically upon the expected duration of a change in the exchange rate and the relative competitive strengths of the firms. The predictions of the model closely accord with the empirical evidence on exchange rate passthrough. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1999
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