Uncertainty Resolution and Strategic Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Industries

Mustafa Caglayan ()

Review of International Economics, 2000, vol. 8, issue 2, 311-318

Abstract: This paper investigates a government’s choice of strategic trade policy when the domestic firm observes a private noisy signal about the stochastic market demand while in competition with a rival firm. The government chooses between quantity controls and subsidies to maximize profits of the domestic firm. Assuming that firms compete à la Cournot in a third country, it is shown that the optimal trade policy depends not only on demand uncertainty but also on the predictability of the true market demand by the firms.

Date: 2000
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