Efficiency with Non‐Convexities: Extending the “Scandinavian Consensus” Approaches

Peter Hammond and Antonio Villar

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 100, issue 1, 11-32

Abstract: There are two distinct “Scandinavian consensus” approaches to public good supply, both based on agents' willingness to pay. A Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium arises from a negative consensus in which no change of public environment, together with associated taxes and subsidies which finance it, will be unanimously approved. Alternatively, in a Lindahl or valuation equilibrium, charges for the public environment induce a positive consensus. To allow general non‐convexities to be regarded as aspects of the public environment, we extend recent generalizations of these equilibrium notions and prove counterparts to both the usual fundamental efficiency theorems of welfare economics.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00087

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the "Scandinavian Consensus" Approaches
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:100:y:1998:i:1:p:11-32

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520

Access Statistics for this article

Scandinavian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Richard Friberg, Matti Liski and Kjetil Storesletten

More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().