Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the "Scandinavian Consensus" Approaches
Peter Hammond and
Antonio Villar
Working Papers from Stanford University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
October 1997 (Now published: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 100 (1998), 11--32.)
There are two distinct "Scandinavian consensus" approaches to public good supply, both based on agents' willingness to pay. A Wicksell--Foley public competitive equilibrium arises from a negative consensus in which no change of public environment, together with associated taxes and subsidies which finance it, will be unanimously approved. Alternatively, in a Lindahl or valuation equilibrium, charges for the public environment induce a positive consensus. To allow general non-convexities to be regarded as aspects of the public environment, we extend recent generalizations of these equilibrium notions and prove counterparts to both the usual fundamental efficiency theorems of welfare economics.
Journal of Economic Literature classification: H41, D51, D6
Keywords: non-convexities, welfare theorems, public goods, public competitive equilibrium, politico-economic equilibrium, Lindahl equilibrium.
Keywords: non-convexities; welfare theorems; public goods; public competitive equilibrium; politico-economic equilibrium; Lindahl equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D6 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Efficiency with Non‐Convexities: Extending the “Scandinavian Consensus” Approaches (1998) 
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