EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Claudia Keser and Frans van Winden ()

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 102, issue 1, 23-39

Abstract: We compare a partners condition, where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game, to a strangers condition, where subjects play this game in changing group formations. From the first period onward, subjects in the partners condition contribute significantly more to the public good than subjects in the strangers condition. Strangers' contributions show continual decay, while partners' contributions fluctuate on a high level prior to decreasing in the final periods. We interpret subjects' behaviour in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future-oriented and reactive behaviour. Copyright 2000 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (380) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2000&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods (2000) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:102:y:2000:i:1:p:23-39

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520

Access Statistics for this article

Scandinavian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Richard Friberg, Matti Liski and Kjetil Storesletten

More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-09
Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:102:y:2000:i:1:p:23-39