Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Claudia Keser () and Frans van Winden ()
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Claudia Keser: Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe

No 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Journal of Economics' 102(1) 23-39.

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good thansubjects in the strangers condition. In thestrangers condition, contributions show a continual decay, while in the partnerscondition, contributions fluctuate on ahigh level until they decrease in the final periods. We interpret subjects'behavior in terms of conditional cooperationwhich is characterized by both future-oriented and reactive behavior.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (307)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000011

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