Conflict and the Social Contract*

Helmut Bester and Karl Wärneryd

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 108, issue 2, 231-249

Abstract: We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00452.x

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Working Paper: Conflict and the Social Contract (2006)
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