Conflict and the Social Contract

Helmut Bester and Karl Wärneryd

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.

Keywords: conflict; social contracts; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Journal Article: Conflict and the Social Contract* (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:94

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